Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger have presented a number of arguments suggesting that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics. If established, this result would be highly significant, as the Shannon information is fundamental to the way we think about information not only in classical but also in quantum information theory. On consideration, however, these arguments are found unsuccessful; I go on to suggest how they might be arising as a consequence of Zeilinger's proposed foundational principle for quantum mechanics.
Introduction
What role the concept of information might have to play in the foundations of quantum mechanics is a question that has recently excited renewed interest (see e.g., Fuchs 2002; Mermin 2002; Wheeler 1990 ). Zeilinger, for example, has put forward an information-theoretic principle which he suggests might serve as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics (Zeilinger 1999) . As a part of this project, Brukner and Zeilinger (2001) have criticised the Shannon measure of information (Shannon 1948) , the quantity fundamental to the discussion of information in both classical and quantum information theory. They claim that the Shannon information is not appropriate as a measure of information in the quantum context and have proposed in its stead their own preferred quantity and a notion of 'total information content' associated with it, which latter is supposed to supplant the von Neumann entropy. Their argument takes two forms: first, that the Shannon information is too intimately tied to classical notions of measurement to be applicable in quantum mechanics; and second, that it cannot be used to define an appropriate notion of 'total information content' for quantum systems. I shall argue that neither of these strategies is successful, concentrating rather more on the latter. I shall then try and indicate why these arguments against the Shannon information are arising as a consequence of Zeilinger's proposed foundational principle for quantum mechanics. The Shannon information H( p) is a measure of uncertainty; it measures the spread of a probability distribution p = {p 1 , . . . , p n }, quantifying our uncertainty about what the outcome of an experiment described by this distribution will be. It takes the following form:
Brukner and Zeilinger's first concern is that interpreting H( p) as a measure of information would require a pre-existing sequence of possessed values in a message being decoded, but such a sequence cannot be taken to exist in general in quantum mechanics. (They consider the example of a string of systems all prepared in a given state |ψ which is not an eigenstate of the observable measured.) Their worry here seems misplaced, however. The possible absence of a pre-existing string of values does not affect the interpretation of the Shannon information, at least as it is usually understood.
Two sorts of explanation standardly relate the Shannon quantity to a notion of information. The first exploits an intuitive link between measures of uncertainty and information: the greater our uncertainty about the outcome of an experiment, the more we stand to gain from actually 4 performing it. From this point of view, the Shannon information tell us our expected information gain before we perform an experiment, or our average gain following many repetitions 1 . Clearly no pre-existing values are called for here, all that is required is that the distribution p correctly characterise the experiment in question.
The second link to information follows from Shannon's 1948 noiseless coding theorem, which states that H( p) tells us the maximum amount that messages drawn from an ensemble characterised by the distribution p can be compressed, and hence indicates the channel resources required to transmit messages produced by an information source modelled by such an ensemble. Again there is no requirement that these messages are composed of fixed pre-existing strings of values. To derive the bound on the optimal compression, we consider very long strings of values. Then, given the appropriate probability distribution we know ab initio that any sequence observed will be one of the typical sequences in which the relative frequency of any type of outcome matches its probability of occurrence; and this on its own is sufficient to calculate the number of bits that will be necessary to specify any string produced, pre-existing or not.
Brukner and Zeilinger's second reason for concern that the Shannon information involves problematic classical assumptions is somewhat more substantial. Shannon's original presentation included a uniqueness proof for the form of H( p) which involved putting forward a number of constraints as reasonable requirements on a measure of uncertainty. The constraint that 5 plays the key role in securing uniqueness is often known as the grouping axiom and takes the following form in the more rigorous presentation of Shannon's argument due to Faddeev (1957) :
For every n ≥ 2,
where p n = q 1 + q 2 .
Brukner and Zeilinger argue that if we are to understand the physical content of this axiom then we must refer to the performance of joint experiments. Thus if we take two experiments A and B with outcomes a 1 , . . . , a n ; b 1 , . . . , b m respectively, then the grouping axiom relates our uncertainty for the performance of these distinct experiments. Eqn. (2), they suggest, will be equivalent to
where
This, however, seems to make it clear that the grouping axiom embodies a particularly classical assumption about measurement, namely that measurements can be made ideally non-disturbing 2 . Furthermore, it seems that if we are going to be able to apply the grouping axiom, then we have to be able to make the assumption that attributes corresponding to all possible measurements can be assigned to a system simultaneously (in this 6 case, a i , b j and a i ∧ b j ). But we know this will not be true in general in quantum mechanics. For non-commuting observables, the probabilities on the left hand sides of eqns. (2) and (3) will not be defined and the grouping axiom will fail to hold. Brukner and Zeilinger thus conclude that the standard uniqueness proof fails in quantum mechanics and that the Shannon information ceases to be justified as a measure of information as it is conceptually tied to these classical assumptions in virtue of the grouping axiom.
The prospects for the Shannon information are not really so bad as this, However, if we want a measure of information for a quantum system itself, a measure of how uncertain we are in general when we know the state of the system, then it is obvious from the beginning that the Shannon information
is not the correct sort of function for us; and there are other, familiar, functions that will do the job instead. A measure of uncertainty is a function of a probability distribution and we know that a joint probability distribution for all possible measurements does not exist; it is for this reason that we introduce measures of mixedness such as the von Neumann entropy which are functions of the state rather than of a probability distribution. It would be a mistake, however, to take it as a complaint against the Shannon information that it does not play this very different sort of role. As a measure of uncertainty it does as much as we could ask of it; we do not want to confuse the question of what makes a good measure of uncertainty with the question of when joint probability distributions can be defined.
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Brukner and Zeilinger's other main argument against the Shannon information is that it is not appropriately related to a notion of 'total information content' for a quantum system. Here they compare H( p)
unfavourably to their preferred quantity
which they relate to their notion of total information content in the following way.
A set of measurements is called mutually unbiased if the sets of projectors {P }, {Q} associated with any pair of measurement bases satisfy Tr(P Q) = 1/n, where n is the dimensionality of the system; there can exist at most n + 1 such bases (Wootters and Fields 1989) , constituting a complete set 4 . Noting the fact that an unknown state ρ may be completely determined by measurement of such a complete set on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems (Ivanovic 1981) , Brukner and Zeilinger suggest that the total information content of a quantum system should be defined as a sum of individual information measures for a complete set of mutually unbiased observables. Adopting the measure I( p), we get:
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The fact that this quantity is invariant under unitary transformations is important, because Brukner and Zeilinger also suggest that it is a necessary constraint on a measure of total information content that it be unitarily invariant. This is the problem they raise for the Shannon informationsubstituting H( p) in eqn. (5) Zeilinger's 'total information constraint', that a measure of information has to sum to a unitarily invariant quantity that can be interpreted as a 'total information content' for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements.
The picture is that the Shannon measure is inadequate as a measure of information gain because it does not satisfy the total information constraint and hence does not tell us how much of the total information content of a system we learn by performing measurements in a given basis. Similarly, a complaint is raised against the von Neumann entropy that it is merely a measure of mixedness, as unlike I tot , it has no relation to the information gained in a measurement unless we happen to measure in the eigenbasis of ρ.
This argument against the Shannon information is only compelling if the total information constraint is in fact a reasonable constraint on individual measures of information. Unfortunately, it is not obvious that it is. To begin with, the 'information content' of a quantum state can mean several different things; we might, for example, be interested in the maximum amount that can be encoded into a given quantum system (the Holevo bound (Holevo 1973) ), or in the average amount of information needed to specify the state of a system drawn from a given ensemble (the classical information of the source). Since 'information content' is not univocal, it seems difficult to maintain that all meaningful individual information measures and measures of information content must have the particular fixed relation expressed in the total information constraint. A further important consideration is that we may well demand to know why information measures for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements should be expected to sum to a particularly interesting quantity in any case. To make this question more pointed, let us ask why it is that I( p) in fact happens to sum to a unitarily invariant quantity.
I( p) is not especially novel as a measure of information; it is one of the general class of measures of the concentration of a probability distribution given by Uffink (1990) . A measure of concentration is the reciprocal of a measure of uncertainty, increasing as a probability distribution becomes more peaked. I( p) is a Schur convex function, rather than a Schur concave function like H( p) and measures of uncertainty; it could be said to measure how well we can predict the outcome of an experiment, rather than how uncertain we are about it. I( p), however, has a particular geometric property as well as being a measure of information; and it is this property, tangential to its role as a measure of information, which explains the relation to I tot and how it satisfies the total information constraint. To see this, we will use the Hilbert-Schmidt representation of density operators, a more general form of the familiar Bloch sphere representation.
The Relation between Total Information Content and I( p)
The set of complex n × n Hermitian matrices forms an n 2 -dimensional real
Hilbert space V h (C n ) on which we have defined an inner product (A, B) = Tr(AB); A, B ∈ V h (C n ) and a norm A = Tr(A 2 ) (Fano 1957; Wichmann 1963) . The density matrix ρ of an n dimensional quantum system can be represented as a vector in this space. The requirements on ρ of unit trace and positivity imply that the tip of any such vector must lie in the n 2 − 1 dimensional hyperplane T a distance 1/ √ n from the origin and perpendicular to the unit operator 1, and on or within a hypersphere of radius one centred on the origin.
It is useful to introduce a set of basis operators on our space; we require n 2 linearly independent operators U i ∈ V h (C n ) and it may be useful to require orthogonality: Tr(U i U j ) = const. × δ ij . Any operator on the system can then be expanded in terms of this basis and in particular, ρ can be written as
where we have chosen U 0 = 1 to take care of the trace condition.
Evidently, ρ may be determined experimentally by finding the expectation values of the n 2 − 1 operators U i in the state ρ. If we include the operator 1 in our basis set, then the idempotent projectors associated with measurement of any maximal (non-degenerate) observable will provide a maximum of a further n − 1 linearly independent operators. Obtaining the probability distribution for a given maximal observable will thus provide n − 1 of the parameters required to determine the state, and the minimum number of measurements of maximal observables that will be needed in total is n + 1, if each observable provides a full complement of linearly independent projectors.
Each such set of projectors spans an n − 1 dimensional hyperplane in V h (C n ) and their expectation values specify the projection of the state ρ into this hyperplane. Ivanovic (1981) noted that projectors P, Q belonging to any two different mutually unbiased bases will be orthogonal in T, hence the hyperplanes associated with measurement of mutually unbiased observables are orthogonal in the space in which density operators are constrained to lie in virtue of the trace condition. If n + 1 mutually unbiased observables can be found, then, V h (C n ) can be decomposed into orthogonal subspaces given by the one dimensional subspace spanned by 1 and the n + 1 subspaces associated with the mutually unbiased observables.
The state ρ can then be expressed as: Brukner and Zeilinger's total information content I tot seems best 14 interpreted as a measure of mixedness, a measure of how much we know in general about what the outcomes of experiments will be given the state (Brukner and Zeilinger 1999b) . The functioning of measures of mixedness can usefully be approached via the notions of majorization and Schur convexity (concavity). The majorization relation ≺ imposes a pre-order on probability distributions (Uffink 1990; Nielsen 2001) . A probability distribution q is majorized by p, q ≺ p, iff q i = j S ij p j , where S ij is a doubly stochastic matrix. That is (via Birkhoff's theorem), if q is a mixture of permutations of p. Thus if q ≺ p, then q is a more mixed or disordered distribution than p.
Schur convex (concave) functions respect the ordering of the majorization relation: a function f is Schur convex if, if q ≺ p then f ( q) ≤ f ( p), and
functions, equality holds only if q and p are permutations of one another).
This explains the utility of such functions as measures of the concentration and uncertainty of probability distributions, respectively. Now, it can be shown (Nielsen 2001 ) that the probability distribution p for the outcomes of any projective measurement is majorized by the vector of eigenvalues λ of the pre-measurement state ρ. This entails that S(ρ) is the infimum of H( p),
is Schur concave), and I tot is the supremum of I( p), I( p) ≤ I tot (I( p) Schur convex); both inequalities reflecting the same fact from the theory of majorization. These relations illustrate why a measure of mixedness is a measure of how much we know given the state: the more mixed a state, the more uncertain we must be about the outcome of any given measurement. However, they also make it clear that S(ρ) does have an explicit relation to the information gain from measurement that would justify its interpretation as a total information content. Conversely, they establish that H( p) does have an appropriate relation to a measure of information content, despite not satisfying the total information constraint; the same relation, in fact, that I( p) has to its associated notion of information content, up to an irrelevant change in sign. We must conclude that the total information constraint is not a reasonable requirement on measures of information; the Shannon information survives Brukner and
Zeilinger's final argument unscathed.
Zeilinger's Foundational Principle
We have seen that Brukner and Zeilinger's worries about the applicability of the Shannon information are misplaced; the Shannon information is perfectly well defined and meaningful as a measure of information in quantum mechanics. I want now to suggest that these worries may have arisen in the first place as a consequence of a proposed foundational principle for quantum mechanics.
Zeilinger ( ...that a system "represents" the truth value of a proposition or that it "carries" one bit of information only implies a statement concerning what can be said about possible measurement results. (Zeilinger 1999, 635) Thus rather than, for example, being a restriction on how much information might be encoded into, or read from, a physical system, we see that the Foundational Principle is a restriction on how much can be said about measurement outcomes, and hence, in particular, is a restriction on how much the state can say about measurement outcomes. For Zeilinger, the state will in general be constituted by amounts of partial information about measurement outcomes. The Foundational Principle requires that the state can only contain a limited amount of information, namely one bit;
hence it follows that the amounts of partial information contained in the state, although how these are to be quantified has not yet been specified in detail, must add up to one bit's worth in total.
This, however, rules out the Shannon information as the measure of the amount 'carried' by the state about a given measurement; we know that in general we will not have a sum to unity for amounts of partial information conceived in the way outlined. 'R' FP) Any projective measurement other than in the eigenbasis of ρ results in a shorter vector in V h (C n ) ('R' FP for 'realist' Foundational Principle.) That is, any such measurement would result in a more spread probability distribution; if we began with a pure state then post-(non-selective) measurement, the ensemble will no longer be represented by a one-dimensional projector. Given this statement of the Principle, we see that it is a matter of choice whether or not, or with which quantities, we chose to discuss the uncertainties associated with the probability distributions generated by the state. 
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Notes 1 H( p) actually takes the form of an expectation value of a function, − log p i , that decreases the more likely an outcome is.
2 Eqn. (3) can be read as saying that if we first perform A and then B, our uncertainty in B can just be updated conditional on the A outcome, our ability to predict B values not being degraded by the A measurement.
